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In times of plenty expectations rise, just as in times of crisis they fall. This can be mathematically described
as a Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy with dynamic aspiration levels, where individuals aspire to be as wealthy as
their average neighbor. Here we investigate this model in the realm of evolutionary social dilemmas on the
square lattice and scale-free networks. By using the master equation and Monte Carlo simulations, we find
that cooperators coexist with defectors in the whole phase diagram, even at high temptations to defect. We
study the microscopic mechanism that is responsible for the striking persistence of cooperative behavior and
find that cooperation spreads through second-order neighbors, rather than by means of network reciprocity that
dominates in imitation-based models. For the square lattice the master equation can be solved analytically
in the large temperature limit of the Fermi function, while for other cases the resulting differential equations
must be solved numerically. Either way, we find good qualitative agreement with the Monte Carlo simulation
results. Our analysis also reveals that the evolutionary outcomes are to a large degree independent of the network
topology, including the number of neighbors that are considered for payoff determination on lattices, which
further corroborates the local character of the microscopic dynamics. Unlike large-scale spatial patterns that
typically emerge due to network reciprocity, here local checkerboard-like patterns remain virtually unaffected
by differences in the macroscopic properties of the interaction network.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation has been theoretically studied in evolutionary
game theory [1–5]. The prisoner’s dilemma game [5, 6] is
classically used to portrait the situation where it is beneficial
for all members of a group to cooperate but, whatever the oth-
ers do, it is always more beneficial for the individual do de-
fect. Due to its broad interpretation, prisoner’s dilemma in-
spired research in social and natural sciences alike [7–23]. In
the prisoner’s dilemma game, two players can either cooperate
(C) or defect (D). Mutual cooperation yields a payoff R (re-
ward) and mutual defection yields P (punishment). If players
have different strategies, the defector receives T (temptation)
and the cooperator receives a small payoff S (sucker). Usually
prisoner’s dilemma follows the hierarchy T > R > P > S
[5, 24, 25]. In classical game theory, defection is the Nash
equilibrium and, therefore, the rational choice. Even so coop-
eration flourishes in human societies, between members of the
same species and in some inter-species symbiosis [26–28].
In an original approach to evolutionary game theory,
Nowak studied spatially distributed populations where play-
ers copy the fittest strategy. This model showed how coopera-
tion can exist in a sea of defectors, the so called “spatial reci-
procity” mechanism – cooperators spontaneously form clus-
ters where they support each other. After this, new mech-
anisms of cooperation promotion were investigated, usually
based on some kind of reciprocity. Among the most studied
mechanisms are kin selection [29], direct and indirect reci-
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procity [30, 31], network reciprocity [32–34], group selection
[35] and heterogeneity [25, 36, 37]. The most common inter-
pretation of these models are in terms of biological evolution,
using birth-death-like dynamics to model the replication of
strategies [1, 38–40]: Players with higher payoff grow in pop-
ulation, alike the selection of the fittest [1, 5, 24]. Dynamics
where players only copy strategies previously available in the
system are called non-innovative dynamics. On the other side,
in innovative dynamics new strategies can arise, for example,
via mutation, exploration, testing etc [5, 24, 41, 42]. While
non-innovative dynamics usually describe long term evolu-
tions, usually innovative dynamics represent situations where
players can take cognitive responses to the environment, like
human interactions [24, 43–45].
Recent works support the idea that human interactions are
strongly influenced by cognitive choices other than just copy
mechanisms [43–47]. New behavior can emerge and peo-
ple often change their opinions without the need of a “copy
source”. In contrast to simpler species, where the evolution
of strategies is basically governed by birth-death processes,
in the human species strategies spread via other mechanisms
as well [24, 39, 48, 49]. For example, recent experimental
results show that individuals decided the strategy in the next
round in moody way[50], that is, individuals will cooperate in
the next round if they have cooperated in the previous round,
otherwise defection will follow. Also, experimental evidence
shows that individual decisions are guided by aspiration lev-
els [46]. So it is typical of human behavior to adopt innovative
dynamics. Note that, in game theory, all possible strategies are
already defined in the strategy space; hence, innovation refers
to the possibility of a new strategy emerge in a monomorphic
population. With this as motivation, we explore innovative
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2dynamics in the context of evolutionary game theory.
The Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy (WSLS; also know as
Pavlov) is an innovative strategy that relies on cognitive ca-
pabilities, instead of replicating process [8, 43, 45, 51, 52].
WSLS was proposed in the famous Axelrod Tournaments
[5, 6] and proved to be very efficient against others strategies
in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma in infinite, well-mixed pop-
ulations. It performed similarly to the famous Tit-For-Tat and
fare even better in noise environments [8]. A WSLS player
keeps its strategy if its payoff is above a desired level –the
individual aspiration– and changes when it is bellow the aspi-
ration. After the initial success in Axelrod tournament, many
different WSLS-like strategies have been proposed [47, 53–
58]. Nevertheless, the aspiration level is usually implemented
as a global external parameter and the decision-making pro-
cess is deterministic: players always change strategy if payoff
is bellow the aspiration level.
Inspired by recent works that interpret aspiration as dy-
namic, or co-evolving parameter [25, 58–66], we propose a
model where an individual aspiration is dynamically deter-
mined by the average payoff of its neighbors. In this way
there is a variety of different aspirations that evolve spatial and
temporally in the population. Specifically, this model relates
to the rationale that aspiration levels tend to follow the wealth
level of one’s society. In the middle of a crisis, humans tend
to lower what they expect to receive in interactions. On the
other side, it is normal to want a higher payoff when all your
peers are faring better than you. We note that previous works
on WSLS spatial games usually considered populations where
WSLS is one strategy, among others, that can be transmitted
via copying mechanisms [24, 42, 67]. Here we consider a
population where only two strategies are available – coopera-
tion and defection – and the update rule is defined as a win-
stay-lose-shift behaviors: if my payoff is bellow the average
payoff of my neighbors then I change my strategy, otherwise
I keep my current strategy. Since new strategies can emerge
in monomorphic populations, this dynamics is innovative.
Our main objective here is to analyze the proposed model,
comparing it to the classic version of non-innovative dynam-
ics, highlighting what differences can arise. In the next sec-
tion we define our model precisely. We also define the im-
itation rule, a non-innovative dynamics that is well studied
in the literature, that will serve as a baseline for comparison.
In Results, we study the master equation and its implications
for the WSLS model, as well as the Monte-Carlo numerical
simulations in square and scale-free networks. We consid-
ered the most studied two-players dilemma games – prisoner’s
dilemma, snow-drift and stag-hunt games. Finally, we sum-
marize our results in the Conclusion section.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Players have only two possible strategies: cooperation (C)
and defection (D). Individuals are represented by the nodes of
a network and the game happens on pairwise interactions be-
tween players and their neighbors. In each interaction, players
receive a payoff according to the usual payoff matrix [5, 24]:
(C D
C 1 S
D T 0
)
,
where T ∈ [0, 2] and S ∈ [−1, 1]. Note that the parametriza-
tion G = (T, S) spans four different classes of games: pris-
oner’s dilemma (PD), snow-drift (SD), stag-hunt (SH), and
harmony games (HG) [5, 24, 25].
The evolution of strategies is defined in two phases. First,
players interact with their neighbors and accumulate the pay-
off obtained in each interaction. Second, players may change
their strategy according to an update rule. We study in this
work the win-stay-lose-shift with dynamic aspiration update
rule and compare it to the classic imitation update rule.
A. WSLS with dynamic aspiration
In this update rule individuals change their strategies de-
pending on the degree of satisfaction with their current pay-
off in comparison to the average payoff of their neighbors.
The WSLS strategy is usually defined in terms of fixed aspi-
ration level as an external parameter [47, 53–57]. Recently,
papers started using heterogeneous and time evolving aspi-
ration levels [25, 58–66]. Our model merges a probabilistic
decision-making process with the concept of aspiration as the
average payoff of the neighbors. In accordance with other co-
evolutionary models [25, 59–61, 64, 65], we intend to make
the aspiration an emerging property, intrinsic to the system.
At every time step, a player is randomly selected to update
its strategy. A player, i, changes its strategy – a cooperators
changes to defection and a defector changes to cooperation –
with probability
p(∆ui) =
1
1 + e−(u¯−ui)/k
, (1)
where u¯ is the average payoff of player i’s neighbors. This
probability distribution, which is based on the Fermi-Dirac
distribution of statistical physics, is widely used in evolution-
ary dynamics [68]. The parameter k measures how often play-
ers make “irrational” choices, changing strategies against the
rationality prescribed by the model [24]. In the literature, usu-
ally we find k ∈ [0.001, 0.3] to simulate a small, but non-zero,
chance of a player making mistakes (trembling hand) [5, 24].
The WSLS update rule has several distinct features. First,
the aspiration value is not an external parameter; it is an
emerging property of the system. Second, each site has its
own aspiration value. Third, the aspiration is subject to tem-
poral and spatial variations. It seems natural to determine the
aspiration in terms of the neighborhood average, as people
tend to lower their expectations during some global crises,
while they raise the expectations when neighbors are faring
better.
It is important to stress that we still have only two differ-
ent strategies in the population C or D. Differently from usual
works[69], here WSLS is not considered a “pure” strategy,
rather it is an update mechanism.
3B. Imitation update rule
As a baseline for comparison, we are going to contrast our
model to the imitation update rule. In this rule, player i update
its strategy by randomly choosing one of its neighbors, j, and
then comparing their payoffs. Site i adopts the strategy of j
with probability
p(∆uij) =
1
1 + e−(uj−ui)/k
, (2)
where ui is the cumulative payoff of site i.
The imitation rule is a non-innovative dynamic [5, 24], be-
cause a player can only change its strategy to the available
ones in the population. This means that new strategies can
never appear once extinguished (the system has absorbing
states) and, most importantly, players never “explore” new
strategies [5, 24, 42]. This update rule is thus associated with
the replication dynamics [1, 5, 24, 40] found in biological sys-
tems. The process of imitation is equivalent to local compe-
tition where death is a random, uniform process and repro-
duction rates are determined by the payoffs (fitness). In this
context, without mutation, extinct species never re-appear.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
It is well known that there is a phase transition in the frac-
tion of cooperation in square lattices with the imitation update
rule: cooperation cannot survive for certain payoff parame-
ters. In the weak prisoner’s dilemma [5, 24], P = S = 0,
cooperation goes to extinction above a critical value of T . In
contrast, we found that in the WSLS with dynamic aspiration
cooperation always survives, even for large T . To understand
this result, first we are going to study the master equation for
the weak prisoner’s dilemma in square lattices. We obtained
analytical results for the limits of large T and k → ∞ and
numerical results for general T and k. After this initial analy-
sis, we are going to simulate the evolution of strategies in the
entire parameter space, as well as in scale-free topologies.
A. Master Equation
On a square lattice, each player interacts with its four near-
est neighbors. A focal site, f , can be in two states: cooper-
ation or defection. In a mean field approximation we set the
probability that the focal site is a cooperator equal to the pop-
ulation fraction of cooperators, ρ. Therefore
ρ˙ = (1− ρ)Γ+(D→C) − ρΓ−(C→D), (3)
where Γ+ (Γ−) is the transition rate accounting the proba-
bility that the focal player will change its strategy to C (D),
given that its current strategy is D (C). We first use the sim-
pler version of the master equation, the well-mixed approach.
Here we consider that every player is connected to every other
player. By doing so there is no spatial structure and we can
consider the average payoff of a single cooperator, uc (defec-
tor, ud), as the average payoff of all cooperators (defectors)
in the population. Moreover, the average aspiration simply
becomes the population average payoff (u¯). The ODE to be
numerically solved uses the transition rates:
Γ+ =
1
1 + e−(u¯−ud)/k
, (4)
Γ− =
1
1 + e−(u¯−uc)/k
. (5)
Assuming the weak prisoner’s dilemma, R = 1 and S =
P = 0, this gives us:
ud =ρ
2R+ (1− ρ)2P + ρ(1− ρ)(T + S) =
=ρ2 + ρ(1− ρ)T, (6)
uc =ρR+ (1− ρ)S = ρR, (7)
u¯ =ρT + (1− ρ)P = ρT, (8)
and finally the ODE:
dρ
dt
=
1− ρ
1 + e−(ρ2(1−T ))/k
− ρ
1 + e−(ρ(ρ−1)(1−T ))/k
. (9)
This first approximation relates to the case where there is
no spatial structure, and therefore sites cannot rely on spatial
correlation effects. The results for this model are shown in
Fig. 1, together with the results for other studied cases. The
next step if one wishes to account for spatial effects is to con-
sider the nearest neighbor approximation [24, 38, 70]. Here
we use a focal site i and define its chance of turning into a co-
operator or defector. We do so by calculating exactly its pay-
off with the first four nearest neighbors of the square lattice.
To calculate the transition rates, we consider all combinations
of cooperators and defectors in the neighborhood of the focal
site. The transition rates in the first neighbor approximation
then become:
Γ± =
4∑
n=0
(
4
n
)
ρn(1− ρ)(4−n)P±(uf , u¯), (10)
where n is the number of cooperative neighbors for each con-
figuration. The term
(
4
n
)
is the binomial coefficient accounting
different combinations of n cooperators and 4−n defectors in
a given configuration (for example, the configuration CDDD
can repeat itself in 4 different ways, while CCCC happens
only once). The term ρn(1 − ρ)4−n weights the probability
of such configuration, with n cooperators, to happen. Finally
P±(uf , u¯) is the probability, in a given specific configuration,
that the focal site will turn into a cooperator (P+) or a defector
(P−). This probability is the only term that is directly depen-
dent on the update rule chosen (Imitation or WSLS). Note that
uf and u¯ depend on the configuration. Since the solution for
the master equation of the imitation model can be found in the
literature [5, 24], here we focus on the solution of the WSLS
model.
The focal site compares its payoff, uf , with the average
payoff of the four neighbors. In a configuration where there
are n cooperators, the focal payoff is uf = nT . To calculate
4u¯, we have to estimate the payoff of each neighbor first. Let
us assume that the probability that a second neighbor of the
focal is a cooperators is also equal to ρ. Given that the focal
is a defector, a cooperative neighbor receives 0 in the interac-
tion with the focal and receives 3ρ on average in the interac-
tion with the second-neighbors. In the same way, a defective
neighbor receives 3Tρ on average. Thus, the average payoff
of the neighbors, u¯, in any configuration with n cooperators is
u¯Ω =
1
4
[n3ρ+ (4− n)3Tρ] = 3
4
(nρ+ 4Tρ− nTρ). (11)
Thus
P+ =
1
1 + e−[T (12ρ−3nρ−4n)+3nρ]/4k
(12)
and
P− =
1
1 + e[T (3nρ+n−4−12ρ)−3nρ+3n]/4k
. (13)
The equilibria of the master equation can be found analytically
in the limit k → 0, where players are assumed fully rational.
In this limit, the fermi probabilities become
P± =

1 if u¯− uf > 0
1/2 if u¯− uf = 0
0 if u¯− uf < 0
(14)
and the transition rates will be just polynomial functions. In
the limit of large T , the difference u¯ − uf can be explicitly
evaluated for each neighborhood configuration of n coopera-
tors. Solving this polynomials we found that
P− =
{
1 if n < 3
0 if n = 0 and ρ 6= 1. (15)
and
P+ =

1 if n = 0
0 if n = 1 and ρ < 4/9
0 if n > 1,
(16)
Simplifying the master equation (3), in the limit for k → 0
and large T, we get
ρ˙ = (1− ρ)5 − ρ(1− ρ)[(1− ρ)3 + 4ρ(1− ρ)2
+6ρ2(1− ρ) + 3ρ] (17)
This equation has a stable fixed point at ρ∗ ≈ 0.209, which
means that cooperation can coexist with defectors even for
high temptation values. This is an interesting result in terms
of cooperation survival and it goes along with different ap-
proaches on innovative dynamics [21, 42, 71]. Note that, in
equation 16, P+ = 0 for n = 1 only if ρ < 4/9. Since
ρ∗ < 4/9, the analysis is consistent.
We proceed with the numerical integration of the original
master equation with arbitrary parameters (any T value), us-
ing the 4th order Runge-Kutta method. Figure 1 summarizes
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FIG. 1. Equilibrium cooperation level in dependence on T in the
WSLS model, as obtained with Monte Carlo simulations and the in-
tegration of the master equation (see legend). “Monte Carlo whole
lattice” refers to the aspiration being equal to the average payoff of
the whole lattice rather than just the nearest neighbors, thus repre-
senting results for the two limiting cases concerning the interaction
range of individual players. There are small quantitative differences
between the presented curves. But more importantly, we see that the
inflection point of the curves and the minimum level of cooperation
are both very similar in all cases, thus pointing to a good qualitative
agreement and a deeper mechanism promoting this effect.
the results for both analytical equations (well-mixed popula-
tion and nearest neighbors of the square lattice). For com-
parison, we also show the results of Monte Carlo simulations,
which will be discussed more thoroughly in the next Section.
We note that in Fig. 1 “Monte Carlo whole lattice” refers to
the aspiration of each site being equal to the average payoff
of the whole lattice. It can be observed that the interaction
topology slightly changes the results in both analytical and
numerical models quantitatively, but not the main characteris-
tics of the WSLS update rule. We also ran Monte Carlo sim-
ulations for different aspiration level ranges, varying it from
just the four nearest neighbors to the whole lattice in a contin-
uous fashion, and the results all fell between the two depicted
limiting cases (the four nearest neighbors and the whole lat-
tice) in Fig. 1. Looking at the results, we can observe that the
WSLS update rule yields specific but generally valid results.
Namely, there is always a minimum level of cooperation in the
population even for large T values, and a smoother decline in
cooperation as T increases when compared to the relatively
steep and sudden transitions observed previously in imitation
models (see also Fig. 3). These results are thus intrinsically
different from those obtained with imitative dynamics, even
in the well-mixed case and regardless of the interaction range
for the determination of payoffs and aspirations. We argue that
this is due to the intrinsic micro-mechanism present in innova-
tive dynamics, which if of course not present in the imitation
model. We will further explore these mechanisms in the next
Section with an analysis of the corresponding spatial patterns.
Lastly concerning the results presented in Fig. 1, we also point
out that the Monte Carlo simulations and the numerical solu-
tions of the master equation agree very well qualitatively.
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FIG. 2. Time evolution of the average cooperation level in the mean-
field approximation. The graph shows two sets of curves, each ob-
tained with different initial conditions. The system always reaches a
stable state, independent of the initial condition for each value of T .
Figure 2 shows that the system reaches a stable state inde-
pendently of the initial fraction of cooperation. This is a very
important feature of the proposed model, since it is well know
that not every update rule will have an equilibrium state that
is independent of the initial conditions [42, 72–74].
The mean-field technique is a good approximation to ob-
tain insights and confirm predictions. However, it often does
not return the same results of the simulation in the structured
population, some times not even qualitatively [24, 75]. In our
case, it is interesting to notice that the mean-field approxima-
tion correctly predicts the existence of the minimum coopera-
tion level.
B. Monte Carlo simulations
We use the asynchronous Monte Carlo procedure to sim-
ulate the dynamics. A random player, i, is selected and the
cumulative playoff of i, as well as the payoff of the first
and second neighbors of i, are calculated. Then player i de-
cides to change its strategy based on the update probability
1 for WSLS or 2 for imitation dynamics. One Monte Carlo
step (MCS) consists of this process being repeated until each
player has the change to change its strategy. We used k = 0.1
in all simulations. For a detailed discussion on Monte Carlo
methods in evolutionary dynamics see [24, 76–78]. In our
simulations we ran the algorithm until the system reaches an
equilibrium state (104−105 iterations) [24, 79]. Then we take
the averages over 1000 Monte Carlo Steps (MCS) for 10− 20
different initial conditions. We use 104 individuals distributed
in a square lattice, unless stated otherwise. The square lattice
have periodic boundary conditions and we start with homo-
geneous strategy distribution (we note that for our model the
initial distribution did not change the final outcome).
We start by comparing the WSLS model to the usual imita-
tion model for the weak prisoner’s dilemma (S = 0). Figure
3 shows the fraction of cooperation in the equilibrium, ρ, as a
0 0.5 1 1.5
T 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ρ
Imitation
WSLS
FIG. 3. Fraction of cooperator as a function of T , as obtained with
Monte Carlo simulations. We used the weak prisoner’s dilemma with
S = 0 and k = 0.1. The behavior of WSLS is different from the
imitation dynamics, especially above T = 1, where here we have a
non-zero cooperation level. Note also how the WSLS has a smooth
drop in T ' 0.6.
function of the parameter T. In contrast to the Imitation model,
that exhibits a phase transition near Tc = 1.04 where cooper-
ators are extinct [24, 75], the WSLS model has a smooth drop
in cooperation levels, but cooperation is not extinct, even for
large T . This result agrees with the predictions of coexis-
tence of cooperation found in our mean-field approximation.
Also notice that cooperation is smaller in the WSLS model
for small values of T compared to the imitation model. Recall
that results for the imitation model are only for the sake of
comparison in this work, since other papers study this model
in depth (for a comprehensive review see [24]).
Figure 4 shows cooperation level in the entire T-S plane for
the imitation and the WSLS model, with cooperation repre-
sented by the color scale.
As expected, in the imitation model there is full cooperation
in the HG quadrant, a mixture of full cooperation and coexis-
tence in the SD quadrant, a sharp division of full cooperation
or full defection for the SH quadrant and only defection for
most of PD quadrant. The only coexistence in PD game is for
small S values (around S = −0.01) [75].
In the WSLS model we see a totally different behavior. Co-
operation coexists with defectors in the entire phase diagram.
More specifically, cooperation is mostly enhanced in the HG
quadrant; there is a sharp division in the SH quadrant; in the
SD there is a smooth variation; and in the PD quadrant co-
operation has the lowest values. The interesting result is that
cooperation levels are non-zero for the whole phase diagram,
the lowest value around 0.2.
It is insightful to see one-frame snapshots of the square lat-
tices after the system reaches a dynamical equilibrium. Figure
5 shows snapshots of the lattice for each model (both imita-
tion and WSLS have the same fraction of cooperation and are
playing the prisoner’s dilemma). Note that the spatial organi-
zation of cooperators is totally different. While in the imita-
tion model, cooperators form islands to survive (as expected)
[24], in the WSLS model cooperators and defectors are homo-
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FIG. 4. Phase diagram depicting the fraction of cooperators (color
bar), depending on S and T for the two different models (WSLS
and imitation). In the imitation model (top), as expected, there is
full cooperation in the harmony game quadrant, some coexistence in
the SD quadrant, a sharp division in the SH quadrant, while most
part of the PD quadrant is dominated by defection, with cooperators
surviving only near the weak PD regime, with Tc ≈ 1.04. For the
WSLS model (bottom) the cooperation is widespread everywhere,
although lower than for imitation in the HG quadrant. We can see that
the model is efficient in maintaining the co-existence of strategies
even for high values of T .
geneously distributed, forming a checkerboard-like pattern.
Similar patterns for innovative dynamics were also found in
[71]. Remarkably, the weak correlation present in the WSLS
is the cause of the success of our mean-field approximation.
To understand the microscopic mechanisms underlying the
evolution of cooperation, we study the deterministic case, ob-
tained in the limit k → ∞ and, again, we set S = 0 for sim-
plicity. We stress that simulations in this limit yield the similar
results are for intermediate k values. The evolution of cooper-
ation in the WSLS model, in contrast to the imitation model,
must rely on a different microscopic mechanisms to promote
cooperation, as indicated by the distinct spatial organizations
of strategies. Since the statistical nature of the Fermi-Dirac
distribution does not allow us to obtain a simple picture of the
mechanisms, we will focus on the deterministic case obtained
in the limit k → ∞, where the site definitively changes its
strategy if ui < u¯, or stays the same in the opposite situation.
We set S = 0, again, for simplicity.
Analyzing a cooperator surrounded by defectors, we see
that cooperation spreads to the second next neighbors, instead
of to its first neighbors, as can be seen in figure 6. Since the
payoff of central site C is lower than the average payoff of its
FIG. 5. Typical snapshots from the Imitation (top) and WSLS (bot-
tom) models, cooperators are dark blue and defector light red. We
can see different spatial organization patterns that spontaneously
emerge. We depict a typical PD game where ρ ≈ 0.25 and
S = −0.01 for both models. The temptation level is Imitation(T =
1.023) and WSLS(T = 1.1).
neighbors, the central site will change to a defector. But at the
same time all second neighbor defectors have a payoff (zero)
lower than the payoff (T ) of the first neighbors defectors, what
causes the second neighbors, to turn to cooperation. The ba-
sic mechanism is the greediness of defectors, surrounded by
other defectors. This makes they constantly change strategy if
there is at least one defector faring better. In other worlds, the
greediness of defectors, leads to their downfall. This micro-
mechanisms also points to the curious phenomena that coop-
erators do not to stick together in this WSLS model.
Our results suggest that the effect of the WSLS mechanism
on cooperation is not directly related to network reciprocity,
where cooperators form clusters of cooperation that provide
mutual help [32–34, 80]. This can be tested by varying the
network topology. We therefore investigate how the models
behaves in scale-free networks [81, 82], a well studied case
of topology that enhances cooperation [83–85]. To have a ro-
bust result, we study both the absolute payoff (the payoff of a
player is just the sum of payoffs obtained in each interaction)
7FIG. 6. Cooperator (dark blue) surrounded by defectors (light red)
in the deterministic version of the WSLS model. Although the focal
site changes to defection, its second neighbors become cooperators
due to the lower payoff when compared to the first neighbors.
and the normalized payoff (the absolute payoff divided by the
number of neighbors) [86, 87]. The networks are generated
with the Krapivsky-Redner algorithm [36, 88], a type of grow-
ing network with redirection (GNR) method. We used scale-
free networks with 104 nodes, irrationality k = 0.1, weak PD
(S = 0) and average connectivity degree of 2.7.
In the imitation model, scale-free networks enhance coop-
eration when absolute payoffs are considered [86, 87]. The
enhancement is dampened if normalized payoff is used, but
still scale-free topology favors cooperation more than square
lattices [9, 24, 75, 81, 83–85, 87, 89–91]. Figure 7 shows the
results for scale free network and square lattice, comparing
both imitation and WSLS models. The effect of scale-free
topology in the promotion of cooperation is much weaker in
the WSLS model than in the imitation model.
The study of the WSLS model in scale-free networks indi-
cates that topology has a small effect in the evolution of co-
operation in the WSLS model, when compared to the effect it
has in the imitation model. It is an interesting result, if we take
into account that topology strongly affects imitative dynamics
[9, 24, 75, 81, 84, 87, 89–93]. The topology independence
strengths the point that the mechanisms promoting coopera-
tion in the WSLS model relies on another source, other than
spatial reciprocity. Recent works found that the system depen-
dency on topology can be irrelevant for some innovative up-
date rules like best response, extortion, and myopic [21, 42].
Finally, our analysis reinforces the fact that network reci-
procity is dependent on the kind of strategy update rule that is
used, and not on the mere presence of network structure. In-
deed, the replicator equation is equivalent to the Monte Carlo
dynamics only when individuals change strategy by copying
each other [1, 24, 42], and this is not the case here. In the
WSLS model, strategies are not replicated in the sense that
they are transmitted from more successful individuals to less
successful ones. Instead, the success of neighbors only influ-
ences ones decision on whether to keep or to change its own
strategy.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we studied the Win-Stay-Lose-Shift mecha-
nism with local average aspiration in the evolutionary game
framework using the master-equation and Monte Carlo anal-
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FIG. 7. Fraction of cooperation as a function of T in two differ-
ent topologies: square lattice, and scale-free network with absolute
and normalized payoff. We see for the imitation model (top) that the
scale-free network with absolute payoff highly enhances coopera-
tion, while the normalized payoff dampens this boost to a substantial
degree. The lowest cooperation is obtained on the square lattice. For
the WSLS (bottom) the different topologies have little effect on the
evolution of cooperation.
ysis. The basic idea is that players aspire to be at least as
wealthy as the average of their neighbors, changing strategy
otherwise. Cooperative behavior always face the challenge to
survive in a population of self-interest individuals, since de-
fecting against cooperators is more profitable. However, we
found that if the motivation of faring as good as the neighbors
is the base of individual behavior, cooperation will emerge in
coexistence with defection. This result was supported by com-
puter simulations in the entire range of payoff parameters and
was confirmed by mean-field approximations.
In imitation models, compact cooperative islands arise
around seeds of successful cooperators. At the border be-
tween cooperators and defectors, the latter will do better and
the islands will spread, sometimes shrink, and in general move
across the network. In WSLS models, successful defectors
will cause an erosion of compact defector patches, since in-
ternal defectors will change their strategies due the high suc-
cess of the defectors at the border. This drastically affects the
whole population, causing cooperators to be homogeneously
8distributed in a checker-board like manner, instead of form-
ing islands. This also results in cooperators lingering even
for high values of temptation and, at the same time, defec-
tors being always present in the population, even for strongly
cooperative games like the harmony game.
The analytical predictions shows a minimum cooperation
level above zero, even for high temptation. The stability was
reached independent of initial conditions, and we prove that
the ODE have a stable equilibrium point with ρ∗ > 0 for large
T . We tested the model using asynchronous Monte Carlo dy-
namics in square and scale-free lattices. Using numerical sim-
ulations for Monte Carlo we still found the basal cooperation
level and independence with the initial state. Even more, co-
operation is widespread through the entire T − S diagram,
differently from the classical non-innovative dynamics where
cooperation does not linger on the prisoners dilemma for most
values of T and S. We deeply analyzed the microscopical
mechanism that leads to the support of cooperation using de-
terministic dynamics. We found out that in this innovative
process, cooperation is transferred to the second neighbors,
instead of the first ones as in copy mechanisms. This drasti-
cally affects the whole population, causing cooperators to be
homogeneously distributed, instead of forming islands. This
also results in cooperation lingering for high values of temp-
tation. At the same time defectors are always present, even in
strongly cooperative games like the harmony game. We stud-
ied the model on scale-free networks and found that the clas-
sical result of cooperation enhancement due to network reci-
procity remained absent, further supporting the claim that in-
novative dynamics does not rely on such reciprocity to main-
tain cooperation. This is interesting, also in the light of recent
research on the importance of the integration of cognitive abil-
ities in game theoretical models [94], and the fact that human
cooperation is likely more related to cognitive strategies than
to effects stemming from replicator dynamics.
Lastly, our work highlights the relevance of the proper
choice of the updating rule when modeling human behavior.
While the evolution of strategies in simpler animals over long
time scales can be described by the replicator dynamics, it is
not always the case when individuals have higher cognitive ca-
pacity and can make choices very fast, in time scales that are
much shorter than the typical time to induce an evolutionary
transition. We note that our results support preceding research
on innovative dynamics, fast decision making, and intuitive
cooperation [95–98], highlighting also the importance of the
different updating rules. In this sense it becomes clear that one
should be very careful when choosing a model to describe a
real-life situation. We hope that this paper will motivate fur-
ther research along this line in the near future.
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